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We consider an axiomatic characterization of the plurality rule,
which selects the alternative(s) most preferred by the largest number
of individuals. We strengthen the characterization result of Yeh (Eco-
nomic Theory 34: 575{583, 2008) by replacing eciency axiom by the
weaker axiom called faithfulness. Formally, we show that the plurality
rule is the only rule satisfying anonymity, neutrality, reinforcement,
tops-only, and faithfulness.
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1 Introduction
We consider the problem of choosing alternatives from a xed set of nitely
many alternatives. A social choice function assigns chosen alternative(s) to
each prole of preferences of individuals in a society. We consider the case
where the number of individuals may vary and each individual's preference
is a linear order (no indierence between any two alternatives).
In this setting Yeh (2008) characterized the plurality rule, which selects
the alternative(s) most preferred by the largest number of individuals: the
plurality rule is the only rule satisfying anonymity, neutrality, reinforcement,
tops-only, and eciency.1 Anonymity and neutrality are standard symmetric
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1Other characterizations of the plurality rule are found in Richelson (1978) and Ching
(1996).
1axioms: the former requires that the names of individuals should not mat-
ter, and the latter requires that the names of alternatives should not matter.
Reinforcement is an invariance axiom which requires that if two disjoint
groups of individuals choose the same alternative, then their union should
also choose this alternative.2 Tops-only requires that the choice should de-
pend only on the information about top-ranked alternatives of individuals.3
Eciency requires that inecient alternatives should not be chosen.
We strengthen Yeh (2008)'s characterization result by replacing eciency
by the weaker axiom called faithfulness: when there is only one individual,
her most preferred alternative should be uniquely chosen (Young, 1974).
Namely, we show that the plurality rule is the only rule satisfying anonymity,
neutrality, reinforcement, tops-only, and faithfulness (Theorem 1).
Our characterization result is related to Young (1974)'s characterization
of Borda's rule (Borda, 1781).4 Young (1974) considered cancellation axiom:
if for all x and y in X, the number of individuals preferring x to y equals
the number of individuals preferring y to x, then all alternatives are chosen.
And Young (1974) showed that Borda's rule is the unique rule satisfying
cancellation and our axioms excepting tops-only. That is,
anonymity; neutrality; reinforcement; faithfulness
+

tops-only () plurality rule (Theorem 1)
cancellation () Borda's rule (Young 1974)
2 Denitions
There is a countable set N of \potential" individuals. Let N be the family of
all nonempty and nite subsets of N. Let X be the nite set of alternatives.
We denote P the set of all linear orders (transitive, antisymmetric, and com-
plete binary relations) on X. Given N 2 N and i 2 N, we denote individual
i's preference by Pi 2 P, a preference prole by PN = (Pi)i2N, and the set
of all preference proles by PN. A social choice function is a mapping
f :
S
N2N PN ! 2X n f;g.
Let T(Pi) be i's top-ranked alternative, and T(PN) = (T(Pi))i2N the
prole of top-ranked alternatives. Let T(x;PN) be the number of individuals
whose top-ranked alternative is x, that is, T(x;PN) = jfi 2 NjT(Pi) = xgj.
2This axiom was proposed independently by Smith (1973), Fine and Fine (1974a, b)
and Young (1974, 1975).
3This axiom has been studied in various elds. See, for example, Moulin (1980), Bar-
bera et al. (1991), Koray (2000), Mihara (2000), and Masso and Neme (2004).
4See also Hansson and Sahlquist (1976).




Yeh (2008) showed that the plurality rule is characterized by the following
ve axioms.
Given N 2 N, let N be set of all permutations on N. Given  2 N,
let P(N) = (P(i))i2N.
Anonymity: 8N 2 N, 8PN 2 PN, 8 2 N, f(P(N)) = f(P).
Let  be the set of all permutations on X. Given P 2 P and  2 , let
(P) be a linear order dened by (x)(P)(y) i xPy. Given N 2 N, let
(PN) = ((Pi))i2N.
Neutrality: 8N 2 N, 8PN 2 PN, 8 2 , f((PN)) = (f(PN)).
Reinforcement: 8N;N0 2 N with N \ N0 = ;, 8PN 2 PN, 8PN0 2 PN0,
f(PN) \ f(PN0) 6= ; ) f(PN;PN0) = f(PN) \ f(PN0).
Tops-only: 8N 2 N, 8PN;P 0
N 2 PN, T(PN) = T(P 0
N) ) f(PN) = f(P 0
N).
Eciency: 8N 2 N, 8PN 2 PN, 9x;y 2 X, 8i 2 N, yPix ) x = 2 f(PN).
3 Result
We strengthen Yeh (2008)'s characterization result by replacing eciency by
the weaker axiom called faithfulness.
Faithfulness: 8N 2 N with N = fig, 8Pi 2 P, f(Pi) = T(Pi).
Faithfulness requires that when there is only one individual, her top-
ranked alternative should be uniquely chosen, or equivalently, inecient al-
ternatives should not be chosen. Thus, faithfulness is weaker than eciency.
Theorem 1 A social choice function f is the plurality rule fP if and only if
it satises anonymity, neutrality, reinforcement, tops-only, and faithfulness.
To prove our theorem, we begin with the following simple observation.
Lemma 1 Suppose that f is a social choice function satisfying anonymity,













3Proof Suppose that f is a social choice function satisfying the three axioms.
Let N 2 N and PN 2 PN. Since f satises tops-only, f(PN) depends only
on T(PN). Furthermore, anonymity and neutrality implies that for all x and
y in X such that T(x;PN) = T(y;PN), x 2 f(PN) if and only if y 2 f(PN).
Suppose that j
S
i2N T(Pi)j = jNj. Then, we have








which completes the proof. 
The following lemma is a variant of Lemma 1 in Yeh (2008). It states
that if f satises our ve axioms and the most preferred alternatives of all
individuals dier, then the chosen alternatives are the most preferred ones.
Lemma 2 Suppose that f is a social choice function satisfying anonymity,
neutrality, reinforcement, tops-only, and faithfulness. For each N 2 N and
each PN 2 PN, if j
S
i2N T(Pi)j = jNj, then f(PN) =
S
i2N T(Pi).
Proof Suppose that f is a social choice function satisfying the ve axioms.
Let N 2 N and PN 2 PN. Suppose, to the contrary, that j
S
i2N T(Pi)j = jNj
and there exists x = 2
S
i2N T(Pi) such that x 2 f(PN). Take any P 2 P such
that T(P) = x. Then, by faithfulness, f(P) = fxg. However, reinforcement
implies that f(PN;P) = f(PN) \ f(P) = fxg, which contradicts Lemma 1.
Thus, if x = 2
S
i2N T(Pi), then x = 2 f(PN). By Lemma 1, we have f(PN) = S
i2N T(Pi). 
Proof of Theorem 1 Obviously, the plurality rule fP satises the ve
axioms. Conversely, suppose that f is a social choice function satisfying the
ve axioms. Due to Lemma 2, it suces to consider only the case where
j
S
i2N T(Pi)j < jNj.5 Suppose that m = maxx2X T(x;PN). Consider a
partition fN1;;Nmg of N such that for each component Nk if i;j 2 PNk,
then T(Pi) 6= T(Pj). Then, for each Nk, j
S
i2Nk T(Pi)j = jNkj, and hence
Lemma 2 implies that f(PNk) =
S
i2Nk T(Pi). Thus, if T(x;PN) = m, then








which completes the proof. 
5The remainder of the proof is the same as the proof in Yeh (2008), since neither
eciency nor faithfulness is not used in the remainder. The same proof is also found in
Ching (1996).
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